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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Imperial is dissatisfied with the three issues presented by Niemela for review. 
Imperial states that the following issues more accurately reflect the issues before this 
Court: 
Issue #1. Was the Trial Court correct in concluding that Niemela failed to set 
forth facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact rebutting the presumption 
that the mailboxes at issue were free from defect or defective condition and that Imperial 
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law? 
An appellate court will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting 
without a jury unless they are clearly erroneous. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 
(Utah 1998). An appellate court reviews a trial court's "legal conclusions and ultimate 
grant or denial of summary judgment" for correctness, and views "the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
Issue #2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in rejecting Niemela's 
February 19, 2010 affidavit? 
A trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of 
discretion. In re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, Both Surface and 
Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, 
3 
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Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab Counties in Utah, 982 P.2d 65, ^ [26, 368 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9, (Utah 1999). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (1977) Defect or defective condition making product 
unreasonably dangerous — Rebuttable presumption. 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product 
which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product 
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in that 
community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, 
dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or 
experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any defect 
or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for 
the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and 
testing the product were in conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or 
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were adopted. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
A 
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stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9) 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Imperial is satisfied with Niemela's "Nature of the Case" and "Course of 
Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Trial Court made the finding of fact that the 1992 Model Mailboxes1 
and related components e.g. knobs, that Niemela complains of were in place in or about 
1995. R.221-22. 
2. In her deposition, Niemela stated: 
Q. I'm interested in the handwritten. 
A. Knob in 1995 on Rural Route 4 Tooele, Imperial mailbox. 
1
 For ease of reference, the mailboxes that were manufactured under the 1992 Standards 
will be referred to as the 1992 Model Mailboxes. 
5 
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Q. So it's your information that these knobs were on these mailboxes in 
Tooele at least as of 1995? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Route number four, is that the route we've been talking about, the 
Overlake? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 193). While Niemela asserts in her brief at page 4 "The bulk of the Imperial 
mailboxes, if not every single mailbox, in the Overlake HOA was installed after the 
February 8, 2001 revisions by the USPS" and cites to affidavit of Niemela (R.107-110) 
for support, the Trial Court rejected this statement from her affidavit as inconsistent with 
her deposition testimony and found that the mailboxes and related components e.g. 
knobs, that Niemela complains of were in place in or about 1995. R.221-22. 
3. The Trial Court found that the 1992 Model Mailboxes at issue were 
approved and in compliance with the 1992 Untied States Postal Services requirements 
and Imperial was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the 1992 Model Mailboxes 
were free from any defect or defective condition. R.220 and R. 92-94. 
4. The Trial Court found that Niemela failed to show that the 2001 USPS 
Standards were in effect in or about 1995 when the 1992 Model Mailboxes at issue were 
manufactured to create a genuine issue of fact to rebut the presumption that the mailboxes 
were free from any defect or defective condition. R. 220-221. 
6 
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5. The Trial Court found that Niemela failed to provide expert or other 
testimony regarding the design of the handles/knobs of the 1992 Model Mailboxes to 
create a genuine issue of fact to rebut the presumption that the mailboxes were free from 
any defect or defective condition. R. 220. 
6. The Trial Court found that Niemela failed to show that Imperial had prior 
knowledge or any knowledge that the manufactured handles/knobs caused injuries or 
were in any way defective to create a genuine issue of fact to rebut the presumption that 
the mailboxes were free from any defect or defective condition. R. 220. 
7. The Trial Court found that Niemela failed to show that the 1992 Model 
Mailboxes in question were "unreasonably dangerous" or otherwise create a genuine 
issue of fact to rebut the presumption that the mailboxes were free from any defect or 
defective condition. R. 220. 
8. The Trial Court found that Niemela did not submit any admissible evidence 
showing a defect or defective condition of the 1992 Model Mailboxes. R. 217-218. 
9. The "facts" contained in Niemela's brief under the section titled "The 
Imperial Mailboxes at Overlake HO A Did Not Comply with the 2001 Standards and were 
Defective" were contained in the February 19, 2010 Affidavit (R. 107-110) and were 
rejected by the Trial Court as inconsistent with her deposition testimony, not based on 
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personal knowledge, lacks foundation, conclusory and/or containing inadmissible opinion 
testimony. R. 217-222 and 203-211. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Niemela cannot challenge the Trial Court's findings of fact because Niemela has 
failed to properly marshal the evidence. The Trial Court correctly concluded that 
Imperial was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it owed no duty to Niemela 
in regards to the 1992 Model Mailboxes. Imperial had no duty to refrain from marketing 
a non-defective product when a revised or safer model was available. Imperial had no 
duty to inform the consumers of the availability of a revised or safer model. The Trial 
Court correctly concluded Niemela's negligence claim failed as a matter of law because 
Niemela did not produce any admissible evidence that her injuries were proximately and 
actually caused by the mailboxes. The Trial Court was correct in concluding that the 
1992 Model Mailboxes were free from defect or defective condition and that Niemela 
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to rebut that presumption. The Trial 
Court was within its broad discretion to reject the February 19, 2010 Affidavit of 
Niemela as inadmissible evidence. 
o 
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ARGUMENT 
I. NIEMELA HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE CANNOT CHALLENGE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS, 
The Trial Court's factual findings cannot be challenged because Niemela has 
failed to properly marshal all the evidence. "In order to challenge a court's factual 
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support o/the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82, TJ 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9). ("A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). To fulfill 
its duty to marshal, Niemela was required to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings [it] resists." Chea 2004 UT 82, % 77, 100 P.3d 1177. Instead of marshaling, 
Niemela simply reasserts the evidence it presented to the trial court and asks the 
Appellate court to reconsider de novo. Niemela's failure to marshal leaves Imperial and 
the Appellate court "to bear the expense and time of performing the critical task of 
marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable." United Park City 
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Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds. 2006 UT 35, % 26, 140 P.3d 1200. 
Accordingly, Niemela cannot challenge the Trial Court's finding of facts because 
Niemela has failed to properly marshal the evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
IMPERIAL WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW ON NIEMELA'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
BECAUSE IT OWED NO DUTY TO NIEMELA IN REGARDS 
TO THE NON-DEFECTIVE 1992 MODEL MAILBOXES. 
The Trial Court correctly concluded that Imperial owed no duty to Niemela in 
regards to the 1992 Model Mailboxes and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
Niemela's Negligence claim. The undisputed facts before the Trial Court were that the 
mailboxes at issue were 1992 Model Mailboxes that had been in place since about 1995. 
Imperial properly established that the 1992 Model Mailboxes were in conformity with 
government standards established for that industry which were in existence at the time 
the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were adopted. Once Imperial established that fact, it 
was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that its 1992 Model Mailboxes were free from 
any defect or defective condition. Niemela was then required to submit sufficient 
admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact to rebut that presumption. 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, p i , 54 P.3d 1054. A 
preponderance of the evidence is required to rebut the presumption of non-defectiveness. 
i n 
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See Ebgert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, f l4, 157 P.3d 347. Niemela failed to do 
so. Niemela failed to submit any admissible evidence that the 2001 Standards were in 
effect when the 1992 Model Mailboxes were manufactured or designed. Niemela failed 
to show that Imperial had prior knowledge or any knowledge that the manufactured 
handles/knobs caused injuries or were in any way defective. Niemela failed to provide 
any expert or other testimony regarding the design of the handles/knobs of the mailboxes 
at issue. Instead, Niemela submitted an affidavit that contradicted her deposition 
testimony, contained conclusory opinions and allegations. Niemela claimed in the 
affidavit that the 1992 Model Mailboxes were defective because they did not comply 
with the 2001 Standards. As addressed below, those opinions and allegations were 
rejected by the Court within its broad discretion. Nevertheless, whether or not the 1992 
Model Mailbox complied with the 2001 Standards is irrelevant to this matter. The 
undisputed facts before the Trial Court were that the mailboxes at issue were 1992 Model 
Mailboxes that were in compliance with the 1992 Standards. Niemela provided no 
admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of fact to rebut the presumption that the 
1992 Model Mailboxes were free from defect or defective condition. Accordingly, the 
Trial Court correctly concluded that the 1992 Model Mailboxes at issue were free from 
defect or defective condition. 
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Once the Trial Court made that determination that the 1992 Model Mailboxes at 
issue were free from defect or defective condition, the Trial Court then correctly 
concluded that Imperial had no duty to refrain from marketing a non-defective product 
when an improved model became available. Niemela is essentially claiming that 
Imperial was negligent by designing a product in conformity with governmental 
standards and by not informing consumers about an allegedly safer model when the 
government changed its design standards. These are the same allegations rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 979 P.2d 317. In Slisze, 
a construction worker injured while using a pneumatic nailer sued the manufactured of 
the nailer under a negligence and breach of implied warranty claim. Slisze claimed that 
the manufacturer was negligent because they failed to stop marketing their product once 
an updated design became available. The Court rejected the claim and stated: 
It is important to emphasize here that Slisze is essentially asserting that 
Stanley had a duty to stop marketing a product that is less safe than another, 
although not defective, or to actively warn and inform consumers that the 
product is less safe. In weighing the factors set out in AMS Salt, we are not 
persuaded that it is necessary or wise to recognize a duty requiring 
manufacturers to discontinue manufacturing less safe but non-defective 
products; there has been no showing that the likelihood of injury would be 
reduced enough to outweigh the costs and burdens of discontinuation. 
Slisze, 1999 UT 20, ^ 12, 979 P.2d 317. In addition in Slisze, the Court refused to 
recognize a duty on the manufacturer to make a safe product safer. The Court states: 
1 0 
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Alternatively, Slisze wants this court to impose a duty on the manufacturer 
to inform consumers about the safer model. Considering the AMS Salt 
factors, we are again unconvinced. To require information to be provided 
to consumers on the availability of the safer model would, in this case 
(where the distinctions in the trip features are obvious), reduce the 
likelihood of injury so minimally that to impose the duty would be unduly 
burdensome. Such a burden might well act as a disincentive for 
manufacturers in the development of safer products when such 
development could force the discontinuation of the less safe model. 
Consequently, Slisze's negligence claim fails for lack of duty, and it was 
proper for the lower court to dismiss it. There is no duty to make a safe 
product safer. 
Id. at T| 13 (internal quotations omitted). Niemela argues on appeal that the 1992 Model 
Mailbox became "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" once the 2001 Standard 
became effective and Imperial then had a duty not to sell a "defective" or "unreasonably 
dangerous mailbox." That argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that the 
1992 Model Mailbox was defective because it did not comply with the 2001 Standards. 
However, as the Utah Supreme Court explained in Slisze, "[w]e have never, nor has any 
other jurisdiction, recognized a duty on the part of a manufacturer to refrain from 
marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or a duty to inform 
the consumer of the availability of the safer model." Slisze, 1999 UT 20,1J10, 979 P.2d 
317. Without a duty, there can be no claim of negligence. See Young v. Salt Lake City 
Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 64, ^  12, 52 P.3d 1230. Therefore, the Trial Court properly 
concluded that Imperial had no duty to Niemela in regards to its non-defective 1992 
1 ^ 
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Model Mailbox and that Imperial was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to 
Niemela's negligence claim. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
NIEMELA'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BECAUSE NIEMELA DID NOT PRODUCE ANY 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT HER INJURIES WERE 
PROXIMATELY AND ACTUALLY CAUSED BY THE 
MAILBOXES. 
The Trial court correctly concluded Niemela's negligence claim failed as a matter 
of law because Niemela did not produce any admissible evidence that her injuries were 
proximately and actually caused by the 1992 Model Mailboxes. In Utah, "[t]he need for 
positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act 
and the Plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of the injury." Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 
2000 UT App 285, ^ [16, 12 P.3d 1015. However, it is only in "the most obvious cases" 
that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove 
causation. Id. In this case, Niemela claims that she suffered "serious and permanent 
physical injuries from opening and closing the pre-2004 Imperial mailbox, including 
injury to her right fingers, hand and wrist, resulting in a permanent impairment of her 
right extremity of 25-27%" from using the 1992 Model Mailboxes. R. 9. However, such 
claims are beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of a layperson. The Trial 
Court was correct in concluding that Niemela needed expert testimony to establish her 
prima facie case of causation and to prevent the fact-finder from resorting to speculation. 
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See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ.. Inc., 2007 UT App 406, TJ23, 176 P.3d 446. Therefore, 
the Trial Court was correct in concluding that Imperial was entitled to summary judgment 
on Niemela's negligence claim as a matter of law because she could not make a prima 
facie case of causation. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE 1992 MODEL MAILBOXES WERE FREE FROM 
DEFECT OR DEFECTIVE CONDITION AND NIEMELA 
FAILED TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT TO REBUT THAT PRESUMPTION. 
The Trial Court properly concluded that Imperial was entitled to an order granting 
summary judgment in its favor because Niemela failed to create a genuine issue of 
material fact to rebut the presumption that the 1992 Model Mailboxes were free from any 
defect or defective condition because they were designed in conformity with the 1992 
requirements of USPS-STD-7. The Trial Court found that the 1992 Model Mailboxes 
were in place on or about 1995. The Trial Court found that the design of the 1992 Model 
Mailboxes at issue were in compliance with the 1992 requirements of the United States 
Postal Service and Imperial was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of non-
defectiveness . The only evidence that Niemela put forth to attempt to rebut the 
The Utah Supreme Court recently ruled that its decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), determining that the statute of repose in the Act was 
unconstitutional, necessarily required that other sections of the Act were also 
unconstitutional because the Act was nonseverable. See Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., 
1<; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
presumption that the 1992 Model Mailbox was non-defective was her inadmissible 
subjective belief that the mailboxes re-designed under the 2001 standards were better 
than those designed under the 1992 standards and that she was injured while opening a 
mailbox. However, the applicable common law rule is that the product is be to viewed in 
the light of "standards established for that industry which were in existence at the time 
the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were adopted." Accordingly, whether or not the 2001 
design is better or whether a product designed under the 1992 standards conforms to the 
2001 standards is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct in determining that 
the 1992 Model Mailbox was free from a defect or defective condition. 
Furthermore, a mailbox is not "unreasonably dangerous" or defective simply 
because it is capable of causing injury. Niemela has provided no admissible evidence of 
manufacturing flaws, no objective admissible evidence of defects with the 1992 design 
when viewed under standards at the time and no admissible evidence of inadequate 
warnings regarding use. Niemela has offered no admissible evidence that the mailboxes 
at issue were not designed in accordance with the 1992 design standards. Niemela did 
alleged that she was injured while opening a mailbox. A product is not defective simply 
Ltd., 2010 UT 8, tlO, 228 P.3d 737.. However, the Court held that due to two decades of 
judicial articulation, the Utah Courts have adopted implicitly into the common law the 
same rule that was enunciated by section 78-15-6. Id. at Tfl7. 
i * 
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because it is possible to be injured while using it. See e.g. Moomev v Massev Ferguson, 
Inc.. 429 F2d 1184 (CA10 NM 1970) (applying New Mexico law) (piece of metal not 
unreasonably dangerous even though caused injury after being struck by hammer). Any 
product is capable of causing injury. Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct in 
determining that the mailbox at issue is not unreasonably dangerous or defective as a 
matter of law. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS BROAD 
DISCRETION TO REJECT THE FEBRUARY 19, 2010 
AFFIDAVIT OF NIEMELA AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, 
The Trial Court was within its broad discretion to reject the February 19, 2010 
Affidavit of Niemela as admissible evidence. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure sets out the substantive requirements for affidavits and states: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). An affidavit that is based upon unsubstantiated belief, contains 
conclusory statements, is not based upon personal knowledge or containing improper 
opinion testimony must be excluded. See, e.g., Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 
748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit based on unsubstantiated belief insufficient); Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS 
Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (affidavits not 
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based on personal knowledge were properly stricken). In the February 19, 2010 affidavit, 
Niemela opines about the "adequate accessibility" of mailbox knobs, the proper depth of 
a knob to allow quick grasping, adequate "finger clearance and surface area for carriers to 
grasp," and what knob depth caused "possible injury" versus depth that was "adequate to 
prevent hand and arm strain and injury." However, the affidavit does not set forth any 
admissible evidence that Niemela has the foundation or expertise necessary to opine on 
the design elements of 1992 Model Mailbox and knobs, the standards within the industry, 
or the medical expertise to opine regarding causation. 
Furthermore, Niemela attempts in the affidavit to opine about the 1992 Model 
Mailbox knobs alleged failure to "operate freely" within the industry standard and snow 
and ice accumulation inside the mailbox. There is no evidence that Niemela has the 
foundation or expertise to opine of the design elements of "operate freely" or whether the 
natural accumulation of ice and snow violates the design standards established by the 
United States Postal Service. 
Niemela attempts to aver that the 1992 Model Mailbox knobs did not "allow easy 
opening and closing requiring no more than 5 pounds of force" and did not "fit and 
operate properly with no unintended catch or binding points". There is no evidence that 
Niemela has the foundation or expertise to opine of the design elements of "easy 
opening", "more than 5 pounds of force" or "fit and operate properly with no unintended 
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catch or binding points" with the industry. Niemela has produced no testing regarding 
the amount of force required to open the mailboxes at issue. 
Niemela states in the affidavit that 1992 Model Mailbox did not "utilize the best 
commercial practice workmanship standards in the fabrication of all components and 
assemblies" and claims the hinges were too light-weight for the cast-metal doors and 
allowed the doors to misalign and jam, or to become frozen shut during adverse weather. 
There is no evidence that Niemela has the foundation or expertise to opine of the design 
elements of "best commercial practice workmanship standards in the fabrication of all 
components and assemblies" or whether or not the hinges were too light-weight or caused 
the doors to misalign and jam or freeze shut. There is no foundational evidence of 
engineering expertise that would allow Niemela to opine about the cause of the doors 
allegedly misaligning and jamming. 
Niemela even attempts to provide expert medical testimony regarding the cause of 
her injuries by stating she had episodes of cramping and pain in her right hand from 
repetitively pulling open the Imperial mailbox doors. Niemela does not have the 
expertise to opine whether or not the cramping and pain in her hand was caused by the 
mailboxes. 
Moreover, these statement (even if admissible) are not material because they are 
Niemela5s subjective conclusory beliefs regarding her application of the 2001 Standards 
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to the 1992 Model Mailbox designed under the 1992 Standards. Accordingly, the Trial 
Court was well within its broad discretion to reject February 19, 2010 affidavit of 
Niemela. 
CONCLUSION 
Niemela's failure to properly marshal the evidence prevents her from challenging 
the Trial Court's findings of fact. The Trial Court found that the 1992 Model Mailboxes 
were free from defect or defective condition and were in place in or about 1995. The 
Trial Court was correct in concluding that Niemela failed to demonstrate that Imperial 
had a duty towards her in regards to the 1992 Model Mailboxes or that her injuries were 
actually and proximately caused by the 1992 Model Mailboxes. The Trial Court was 
correct in concluding that Niemela failed to set forth facts sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact rebutting the presumption that 1992 Model Mailboxes were free 
from defect or defective condition. The Trial Court was correct in concluding that 
Imperial was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Trial Court was within its 
broad discretion in rejecting Niemela's February 19, 2010 affidavit. Accordingly, the 
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decision of the Trial Court must be affirmed. 
DATED February 25, 2011. 
RAY LEGO & ASSOCIATES 
Cory D. Memmott 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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